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ACCEPTANCE OR ALIENATION: 
FOREIGNERS IN A 
REUNITED GERMANY 
Christopher Tam 
Introduction 
October 3, 1990, stands as a momentous 
day in German history for several reasons. On 
that day, the "Iron Curtain," having stood as an 
impenetrable barrier between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic for over forty years, offi-
cially ceased to be; and 80 million people 
became inhabitants of a reunited Germany. But 
there is more to October 3, 1990, than just 
"Unification Day." That day marked the begin-
ning of a long transformation process involv-
ing economic, social, and political changes, the 
aim of which was to equalize the standards of 
living in all parts of the country. This process 
is by no means over; indeed, Germans are now 
only beginning to grapple with the new reality. 
And perhaps no aspect of this new reality is 
more controversial or enigmatic than that of 
the 7.2 million Auslander (foreigners) present-
ly living in Germany. 
3 
Issues centering around foreigners and 
immigration policies have elicited a number of 
different reactions from Germans, politicians, 
and foreigners themselves. Many, including 
extreme right-wing organizations, have been 
quick to portray the Auslander as being the 
cause of all social malaise experienced in the 
nation: foreigners take jobs away from Germans, 
they strain the welfare system, and they engage 
in criminal activity. Many have expressed their 
hatred for the foreigners through extreme right-
wing violence and through the perpetuation of 
slogans such as "Germany for the Germans! " 
and "Foreigners out!" 
Others offer a different perspective, argu-
ing that Germany is very much a welcoming 
society. Politicians point out that Germany's 
asylum law is very liberal, and that Germany 
accepts more refugees than any other nation in 
Europe. Yet why do politicians still insist on 
declaring Germany a "nonimmigrant country?" 
If it is the case that the majority of foreigners 
identify more with Germany than with their 
home country, how does one explain the low 
naturalization rate? 
The purpose of this paper is to resolve 
such blatant contradictions and paradoxes. I 
first focus on how historical factors and events 
paved the road for Germany's current immi-
grant crises. I then proceed to analyze the 
responses- political and social- to the issues 
at stake from the perspectives of politicians, 
native Germans, and foreigners as to whether 
they are ameliorating or exacerbating the situ-
ation. By dispelling most myths and consider-
ing all viewpoints, the status of foreigners in 
the Germany of 1998 should become a little 
more clear. Finally, I consider future courses 
of action for the country to pursue. 
Historical Experiences: Origins of 
the "Foreigner Problem" 
Germany's current foreigner problem has 
its roots in the years following the end of World 
War II. German citizens living in the Eastern 
German provinces and in Eastern Europe 
became victims of revenge and expulsion; it is 
estimated that 1.6 to 2 million Germans per-
ished between 1946 and 1950. (Kurthen, p. 919) 
All in all, about 15 million refugees flowed 
across the borders into what was left of war-
devastated Germany in the first ten years after 
the war ended. (Thranhardt, p. 167) 
The absorption of these refugees helped 
fuel the economy, and the number of jobs avail-
able was rising each year. By 1961, however, 
immigration from the East dried up, and the 
federal government began looking beyond its 
borders to fill its growing job vacancies. It did 
not have to look far, for southern European 
nations were only too glad to accept Germany's 
offers. Yugoslav and Italian single men were 
attracted by the prospect of earning higher 
incomes and getting better training than they 
could in their home countries. Similarly, their 
governments supported this emigration: it low-
ered the unemployment rate and it raked in for-
eign currency. (Ardagh, p. 275) As a result, 
Germany signed several treaties with other 
European nations, including Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, 
authorizing it to set up recruiting offices in 
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their cities. Recruitment was overseen by the 
Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit, a tripartite board con-
sisting of members of the federal government, 
the employers, and the unions, all intent on 
pushing economic growth to its fullest. 
(Thranhardt, p. 169) 
Between 1960 and 1973, an estimated 18 
to 19 million migrants worked in Germany. 
(Kurthen, p. 922) These Gastarbeiter, or "guest 
workers," took up jobs in mines, on building 
sites, and as janitors- jobs shunned by the 
majority of Germans. They received the same 
pay, welfare, and social rights as did their 
German counterparts. (Ardagh, p. 276) 
Employment was only intended to be tempo-
rary; it was expected that the labor migrants 
would return to their home countries after a 
stay of between one and three years. (Kurthen, 
p. 922) However, about four to five million for-
eign workers decided to remain permanently in 
Germany. (Kurthen, p. 922) 
With the worldwide oil crisis of 1973 and 
the ensuing recession, new recruitment of for-
eign workers from outside the European 
Community (EC) came to a halt. In addition, 
incentive schemes for migrant workers to 
return home were implemented. Officials 
designed these policies hoping that Germany's 
foreign population would eventually decrease. 
(Kurthen, p. 922) In fact, the opposite effect 
occurred. Gastarbeiter knew that they would 
lose their work permits if they left Germany for 
more than three months. "Finding German 
money sweeter than Turkish honey" (Ardagh, 
p. 276), many migrants decided to stay and 
bring their families to join them. Consequently, 
those seeking immigration into Germany on 
the basis of family ties (about 50,000 to 100,000 
per year) comprised about 90 percent of all 
immigrants after 197 4. (Kurthen, p. 923) 
Indeed, while the foreign working population 
became stabilized after the recruitment stop in 
1973, the overall foreign population increased 
from 4.1 million in 1974 to 4.8 million in 1990. 
(Thranhardt, p. 171; Ardagh, p. 276) On the eve 
of reunification, the majority of foreigners 
residing in Germany were no longer regarded 
as merely guest workers. About 60 percent of 
the total were family dependents (Ardagh, 
p. 276); they were immigrants, and they were 
there to stay. 
Immigration levels peaked again in the 
wake of reunification. Along with the absorp-
tion of ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) 
and immigrants from the former German 
Democratic Republic (Ubersiedler), Germany 
also became a magnet for refugees and asylum-
seekers. A combination of civil war in the 
Balkans and the breakdown of communist 
Eastern Europe regimes led to a peak of 438,000 
asylum-seeking applicants in 1992 compared to 
only 121,000 in 1989. (Faist and Haubermann, 
p. 94) All were lured by images of economic 
prosperity and a better quality of life. Whereas 
foreigners constituted only 7. 7 percent of 
Germany's total population in 1989, they made 
up close to 9 percent of the total population in 
1997. (Papademetriou, p. 14; "Right-Wing 
Violence ... ") The demographic characteristics 
of the 7.2 million Auslander currently living in 
Germany will be discussed in the next section. 
Demographic Characteristics of 
Germany's Foreign Population 
As of 1995, Germany had a total popula-
tion of approximately 81.8 million, 7.2 million 
of whom were foreigners. ("The People") The 
largest foreign presence in Germany is com-
prised of 2,014,000 Turks, followed by members 
of the former Yugoslavia (798,000 from present-
day Yugoslavia, 316,000 from Bosnia-
Hercegovina, and 185,000 from Croatia). 
Foreign nationals from the countries of the 
European Union are also present in Germany, 
including 586,000 citizens from Italy, 360,000 
from Greece, 277,000 from Poland, 184,000 
from Austria, 132,000 from Spain, and 125,000 
from Portugal. There are also foreign nation-
als from other parts of Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia. ("The People") 
The majority offoreigners live in the west-
ern part of the country in metropolitan areas. 
Close to 9 percent of the population in the west 
are foreign residents as compared to less than 
1 percent in the east. In the west, most foreign 
communities are concentrated in areas domi-
nated by heavy industry or metal manufactur-
ing industries: Baden-Wurttemberg, the Rhine 
valley, and the Ruhr region. In the east, Berlin 
is the only city that has a high foreign popula-
tion. Foreign nationals living in the west are 
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mainly comprised of Turks, citizens from the 
former Yugoslavia, Italians, and Greeks. In the 
east, most of the foreigners are eastern 
European in national origin. (Krueger and 
Pischke, p. 192) About half of the Auslander 
have resided in Germany for more than ten 
years. Almost two-thirds of the foreigners were 
born in Germany, and just under a million are 
either 25 years old or younger. ("The People") 
Citizenship and Naturalization: 
Incongruent Policies 
In his book, Here for Good: Western 
Europe's Ethnic Minorities, Stephen Castles, an 
English immigration expert, writes: "History 
shows that labor migrations always lead to per-
manent settlements." (Ardagh, p. 285) This 
being the case, it should logically follow that 
most immigrants should naturalize and become 
citizens. But Germany's refusal to relinquish 
its view of volkszugehorigkeit (nationhood) 
makes this process of legal integration a daunt-
ing step for its immigrants to take. 
German citizenship is based on the prin-
ciple of jus sanguinis: only individuals who are 
German by blood have an automatic right to 
citizenship. This biological definition of 
Germanness was first enforced in 1913 and was 
based on the belief that German unity could 
only be achieved by German people. 
(Klusmeyer, pp. 84-85) Foreigners are still wel-
come to apply for German citizenship; in fact, 
amendments to the Constitution in 1991 and 
1993 have made naturalization easier and 
cheaper to obtain. ("Bloody-minded," p. 56; 
"German Citizenship ... ") Currently, those 
between the ages of 16 and 23 with eight years 
of schooling and older adults who have resided 
in Germany for fifteen years have a claim to cit-
izenship. In both cases, applicants must be flu-
ent in the German language and must not have 
been convicted of a major felony. Additional 
changes to the Constitution are being consid-
ered to allow third-generation children of 
immigrants with at least one parent who was 
born in Germany to choose by the age of 18 
whether they want German citizenship. 
("Bloody-minded," p. 56) 
Still, the annual naturalization rate is a 
mere 3 percent. (Kurthen, p. 932) Indeed, in a 
survey conducted in 1995, 51 percent of foreign 
parents disapproved of the idea of having their 
children naturalized. ("German Citizenship ... ") 
Reasons cited for their wariness included dis-
couragement over the complexity of the natu-
ralization process, the fear of being assimilated 
into a Christian culture, and the concern that 
they would become isolated from their families 
in their native countries. (Klusmeyer, p. 90) But 
the overriding concern that immigrants 
expressed was that they would have to give up 
their previous citizenship- a concern that could 
be assuaged if Germany would embrace dual cit-
izenship. Indeed, German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl's party, the Christian Democrat Union 
(CDU), wants to expand citizenship to those who 
are born on German soil. Other political parties, 
such as the Christian Social Union (CSU), how-
ever, oppose the plans of the CDU. ("Who Is a 
German?" p. 45) As Hans-Peter Miiller, chair of 
the Institute for Social Sciences at Humboldt 
University, explains, conferring political clout to 
foreigners may clear the way for immigrant con-
cerns to filter their way into German polity. He 
asks: "Do German parties really want to have 
Turks directing their policies?" 
What foreigners see in the current policies 
is not integration but assimilation. Becoming 
German means denying their ethnic heritage, 
indeed a part of their identity. As long as the 
German government refuses to embrace dual 
nationality, amendments to facilitate the natu-
ralization of foreigners will have little impact. 
Until Germany acknowledges itself as a multi-
cultural nation, the Ausliinder will continue to 
"live in the paradoxical role of Germans with a 
foreign passport." (Smith and Blanc, p. 76) 
Risk Phenomenon: Current German 
Perceptions of "the Other" 
Shortly after reunification, the "foreigner 
problem" was identified by three-quarters of 
Germans surveyed as the most important issue 
facing the nation. (O'Brien, p.l071) Specifically, 
they are concerned that Germany has ineffectu-
al asylum laws, that immigrants take jobs away 
from Germans or live off the welfare system, and 
that Germans are "becoming a minority in their 
own land." (O'Brien, p. 1067) According to social 
scientists, many of these claims have been 
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deemed inaccurate and conceived in frenzy. 
For example, the claim that Germany 
accepts too many refugees is exaggerated. On 
average, Germany rejects 95 percent of appli-
cants for political asylum. (O'Brien, p.l067) 
Demographers expect that the German popu-
lation will decline from over 7 4 million in 1990 
to 60 million in 2030. In light of Germany's low 
birth rate, an annual inflow of 300,000 immi-
grants is needed over the next thirty years in 
order to maintain the size of the present 
German labor force. (Wingen, pp. 712-13). 
Moreover, as George Borjas and other labor 
economists have demonstrated, the native 
economy benefits from immigration. (p. 5) 
Immigration has been correlated with benefi-
cial trade relations, investments, savings, and 
contributions to welfare. (Kurthen, p. 934) 1\vo 
migration experts, Michael Bommes and Frank-
Olaf Radtke, estimated that in Bielefeld, a city 
with 300,000 inhabitants, 298 elderly would 
have to be supported by 1,000 Germans 
between the ages of 18 and 65. If foreign inhab-
itants were included, the same 1,000 Germans 
would only have to support the social infra-
structure of 267 elderly, thereby lessening the 
contribution of each German to the welfare sys-
tem. (p. 81) Finally, the fear that Germany is 
being overrun by foreigners is exaggerated as 
the Auslander do not have rights to vote or to 
hold public office. (O'Brien, p. 1067) 
Such logical, coherent arguments, how-
ever, are not incorporated into current immi-
gration policy. Peter O'Brien attributes the 
declining influence of migration experts on 
public policy to a loss of "political" and "episte-
mological" privileges. (p. 1075) Acknowledging 
Ulrich Beck's Risk Society: Towards a New 
Modernity, he argues that in this postmodern 
era, social scientists are not trusted as "ratio-
nal consultants" because their platforms have 
been designed with the intention of earning 
acceptance from political parties. (p. 1075) 
Consequently, the government has chosen 
to downplay the benefits that immigration pro-
vides Germany and instead plays on the feelings 
of the masses, perpetuating a negative image of 
the foreigner. Germany clings to the notion 
that it is not a country of immigrants, but the 
lax handling of the sudden influx of refugees 
following reunification bespeaks of a very lib-
eral asylum policy. Indeed, the Kohl govern-
ment has consistently shied away from a pub-
lic debate about immigration and asylum poli-
cies. Sixty to 70 percent of those rejected as de 
jure refugees end up staying indefinitely in 
Germany because, owing to a backlog of court 
cases, extraditions are not being enforced. 
(Kurthen, p. 926) The asylum crisis, fostered 
by an incompetent administration, was finally 
addressed in 1993 when a series of right-wing 
events prompted politicians to limit the right 
to seek asylum status to those from politically 
oppressed nations. (Kurthen, p. 927) 
Even then, Kohl's declaration that the 
reform to the asylum law was a response to 
Germany's "state of emergency" did little to 
strike at the heart of the problem. (Klusmeyer, 
p. 105) Instead of emphasizing the numerous 
benefits immigrants have brought to Germany 
and that "the dignity of man [including the 
Auslander] shall be inviolable" (Article 1 of 
Germany's Constitution; Cohn-Bendit et al., 
p. 9), the politicians reinforced the perception 
of Auslander as the "Other": a group of indi-
viduals with no claim to German citizenship. 
Reactions to "the Other": 
Xenophobic Tendencies 
With immigration and the status of for-
eigners left ambiguous in the early 1990s, many 
Germans became alarmed by sensational media 
reports and party politics that Germany was 
being overwhelmed by "a new mass-migration." 
(Bade, p. 94) In 1991, a poll reported that 96 
percent of Germans surveyed were opposed to 
accepting foreigners coming to Germany for 
economic opportunity and 69 percent urged 
outright rejection of asylum. (Klusmeyer, 
p. 102) Unhappy with the ease with which 
immigrants and asylum seekers were finding 
their niche within Germany's borders, a wave 
of xenophobia and ethnocentrism ensued. 
The backlash against foreigners came to a 
head in 1992. By then, it had become apparent 
that the "better life" espoused by supporters of 
reunification was far from becoming a reality. 
In the eastern Lander, unemployment had 
reached 13.4 percent, 7 percent higher than in 
the western Lander. Youth centers were clos-
ing, rents were increasing, and social support 
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payments were dwindling. (Klusmeyer, p. 103) 
Consequently, many disillusioned Germans 
made foreigners the scapegoats for their woes 
and identified with right-wing extremist parties 
such as the German People's Union (DVU) and 
the Republikaner Party. 
This rising xenophobia culminated in a 
series of violent offenses against both foreign 
residents and asylum seekers. On August 22, 
1992, hundreds of German youths besieged an 
asylum shelter in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, their 
actions cheered by neighbors. Later, on 
November 23, three Turks were killed in Molln 
in an arson attack. (Schneider, p.179) All in 
all, in 1992 there were 2,639 violent offenses 
motivated by right-wing tendencies as com-
pared to only 309 in 1990. ("Right-Wing 
Violence ... ") A study by Alan Krueger and Jorn-
Steffen Pischke reported that between 1991 and 
1993, there was a higher incidence of attacks 
against asylum seekers than against foreign 
workers. Fifty-four percent of violent incidents 
reported in the east and 43 percent of those 
reported in the west were against asylum seek-
ers. (p. 197) The victims in the east were pre-
dominantly from eastern Europe and former 
communist countries, whereas Turks com-
prised the largest group of victims in the west-
ern Lander. (Krueger and Pischke, p. 192) 
The tragedies of Molln and Rostock 
prompted a crackdown on right -wing extremism 
in addition to reform of the asylum law. Surveys 
and polls conducted during 1992-1993 clearly 
showed that a majority of Germans were dis-
tancing themselves from xenophobia, ethno-
centrism, and racist prejudice. (Kurthen, p. 928) 
During the winter of that same period, over 3 
million Germans participated in candlelight 
marches in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, and Bonn 
to show their support for the Auslander. The 
government also enacted several measures to 
counteract the right-wing violence including the 
banning of right-wing parties, the introduction 
of new criminal laws that expedited prosecution, 
and the establishment of special anti-extremist 
police units. ("Right-Wing Violence ... ") 
Since 1992 the initial social and political 
chaos of reunification has subsided and the 
number of violent crimes has decreased by 70 
percent. In 1996 the Deferral Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution reported only 
781 violent offenses committed against for-
eigners. Support for right-wing organizations 
has weakened; in 1995 it was recorded that 
46,140 Germans (0.06 percent of the popula-
tion) had right-wing leanings, 6,200 of whom 
were militant. ("Right-Wing Violence ... ") 
While these numbers suggest that public 
resentment against the foreigners may be on 
the wane, it does not imply that xenophobia has 
been eradicated. In fact, Peter O'Brien suggests 
that a different type of xenophobia may be pres-
ent among the Germans. In the early years fol-
lowing reunification, German xenophobia was 
characterized by a fear of being cheated out of 
the nation's resources. Now, the fear is not so 
much based on prejudice but rather that the 
economy and the welfare state may be so strong 
that they attract more people than they can sus-
tain. In addition, the tolerance and respect for 
multiculturalism embraced by the Germans 
may lead foreigners to become complacent 
about accepting German citizenship. (pp. 1073-
74) Whatever anti-foreigner sentiment exists, 
the politicians and the media have a responsi-
bility to steer the public away from the path that 
brings back the horrors and shame of the 
Weimar Republic. 
The Lives of the Auslander: General 
Observations 
It is difficult to conclude with certainty 
whether the lives of the Auslander are improv-
ing or how their attitudes towards German 
nationals can be characterized. Few studies 
exist that deal specifically with foreigners in 
Germany. As Thomas Cusack of the Social 
Science Research Center in Berlin explains, 
since foreigners "lack political clout," they are 
also excluded from national surveys and polls. 
Moreover, just as the composition of Germany's 
foreign population is variegated, so are their 
opinions. I can only base my observations on 
particular case studies and inferences drawn 
from related fields of research. 
If the quality of life can be measured sole-
ly by socioeconomic indicators (e.g., income 
earned, number of high school graduates), then 
it appears that the Auslander have been mak-
ing steady progress since the 1970s. (O'Brien, 
p. 1072) The most notable aspects of their 
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upward mobility are their rising numbers in 
vocational training and entrepreneurial activi-
ty. According to the Nuremberg-based Federal 
Employment Services, the number of foreign-
ers applying to programs that combined class-
room and on-site training has doubled over the 
past ten years. A growing number of foreign 
nationals are seeking training in industry, com-
merce, banking, the insurance industry, hospi-
tality services, and transportation. Currently, 
foreigners comprise 8.4 percent of trainees, 4.2 
percent more than the year before. ("Number 
of Foreign Trainees ... ") 
Although foreigners as a whole appear to 
be breaking through the glass ceiling, newly 
arrived migrants, by virtue of their lower edu-
cational qualifications, are placed in the weak-
est segments of the labor market, such as in 
heavy industry and mining where they work in 
shifts, are paid lower wages, and face greater 
occupational hazards. (Klusmeyer, p. 95; 
Bommes and Radtke, p. 82) Barred from the 
high-paying sectors of the economy such as 
craftsmanship, some have turned to the shad-
ow economy. No official data exists, but the 
number of unregistered construction workers 
in Berlin, for instance, is estimated to have 
increased since reunification. (Hillman and 
Rudolph, p. 10) 
Not surprisingly, as a response to their 
probable unemployment many foreigners have 
become self-employed. Felicitas Hillman and 
Hedwig Rudolph of the Social Science Centre in 
Berlin found that the percentage of foreigners 
among those declared as self-employed in the 
Federal Republic increased from 2.7 percent in 
1978 to 7.3 percent in 1995. (p. 14) The num-
ber of new firms in foreign ownership increased 
from 3,867 in 1991 to 5,302 in 1995. (p. 15) In 
that same time period, the number of German 
firms dropped from 39,906 to 38,921. (p. 15) 
Their entrepreneurship has certainly benefited 
the local economy. Indeed, a study done in 1994 
estimated that 33,000 Turk businesses created 
125,000 jobs. (Klusmeyer, p. 1072) 
Overall, then, all the numbers appear to 
indicate that foreigners are playing an integral 
role in German economic life and one that, as 
interest in vocational training rises, is likely to 
expand. The reality behind social integration, 
however, is much more complex. Many orga-
nizations have been established by Germans to 
provide aid to the immigrants. The welfare 
problems of the Greeks are tended to by a fed-
erally subsidized German Protestant organiza-
tion while Caritas, an international Catholic 
organization, takes care of welfare problems 
arising out of the Italian and Greek populace. 
(Ardagh, p. 278) In addition, churches and 
other volunteer organizations run welfare cen-
ters and help immigrants' children with their 
school work. (Ardagh, pp. 278-79) Still, some 
are convinced that more needs to be accom-
plished. Max Wingen of the Federal German 
Ministry for Family and Senior Citizen Affairs 
notes that "future immigrants will arrive in 
Germany from distant cultural areas with sig-
nificantly different notions of social values." 
(p. 712) In order to accommodate this inflow, 
social counseling services and German lan-
guage instruction will be crucial. However, as 
Michael Bommes and Frank-Olaf Radtke write, 
since the recruitment of Gastarbeiter has 
ended, the government seems to be pulling 
away from establishing offices geared toward a 
specific culture to more general ones that han-
dle the problems of all migrants. (p. 83) Their 
observation is that "there seems to be no need 
anymore for cultural identity ... to be pre-
served." (p. 83) If they are correct, then the past 
achievements of social integration are in dan-
ger of becoming unraveled. 
While current law dictates that a foreign 
national must renounce his former citizenship 
before he becomes naturalized, no law prevents 
cultural minorities from celebrating their dif-
ferent heritage. Many Turks, for instance, have 
established their own Islamic organizations. 
(Ardagh, p. 283) Nevertheless, it appears evi-
dent that most national groups tend to keep to 
themselves, thereby complicating the integra-
tion process. (Wingen, p. 716; Ardagh, p. 282) 
In a 1992 survey completed by elderly Italian 
nationals living in Germany, close to 40 percent 
expressed the preference to have more social 
contacts than the few close ones they had. 
(Goldberg, p. 143) The ethnically-defined clus-
ters may in part be due to the "culture shock" 
many Germans are experiencing towards 
aspects of foreign cultures. (Ardagh, p. 278) 
Given the modest hand that Germans have 
extended, are the Auslander content with their 
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lives as residents of Germany? Hans-Jurgen 
Wagener, professor of microeconomics at 
Europa-Universitat Vladrina, Frankfurt/Oder, 
surmises that second- and third-generation 
immigrants are likely to identify more with 
Germany than with their native country since 
they have been born, raised, and schooled in 
Germany. One news story reported the lament 
of a Turkish national who was to be deported 
back to Turkey for committing a serious crime: 
"[Turkey is] not a totally unknown quantity ... 
but after six or seven weeks, I get really home-
sick. I long to get back to Berlin, its language, 
its streets and cafes -and my friends ... " 
(Springate, p. 10) However, according to 
Wagener, for first -generation immigrants the 
desire to return to their native country proba-
bly remains strong. In the same survey of elder-
ly foreigners conducted in 1992, 31 percent 
stated that they wanted to return to their native 
land, while 34 percent expressed the hope of 
spending part of their old age in their native 
country. (Goldberg, p. 143) 
With the demise of right-wing extremism, 
the rise in economic opportunities, and the sup-
port shown by their fellow German citizens, it 
is hard to picture many Auslander leaving this 
picturesque life behind. Nonetheless, there is 
still a "mental wall" that both Volk and 
Auslander must cross in order that they can 
come to appreciate the others' ways and habits, 
thereby feeling confident about social interac-
tion and intercultural mixing. 
Conclusion 
Having re-examined Germany's experi-
ence with the Auslander before and after reuni-
fication from the perspective of both German 
nationals and foreigners, can we conclude that 
the Auslander are still branded as outcasts of 
German society or have they come to be accept-
ed as integral members? For the most part, I 
would venture to characterize the Auslander as 
a group that is slowly but surely rising in sta-
tus as integral and, therefore, accepted mem-
bers. With the exception of political power, the 
foreigners stand on equal footing with the 
Germans in access to health care, retirement 
benefits, and unemployment insurance. 
Foreigners are no longer limited to menial jobs, 
and businesses are actively recruiting foreign-
ers to serve in clerical or marketing capacities. 
Finally, racial violence is on the decline, and 
personal interracial friendships are being 
forged, albeit warily. (Ardagh, p. 284) 
Tolerance and acceptance of German for-
eigners will continue to climb, but unless three 
stumbling blocks are removed, progress will 
stop short of reaching the summit. First, 
Germany should take actions that place the for-
eigner in a positive light. An official immigra-
tion policy must be defined, one that is based 
on migration research and one that comple-
ments those of the members of the European 
Community (EC). As a partner in the 
Maastricht and Schengen Agreements, 
Germany has pledged a commitment that it and 
the other EC members will come up with supra-
national solutions that reflect migration and 
asylum policy coordination. (Wingen, p. 718; 
Klusmeyer, p. 108) By eliminating the loop-
holes and inefficiencies present in the current 
system, Germans will soon learn to perceive the 
Gastarbeiter as legal residents rather than as 
being associated with those who are illegally 
seeking entry into Germany. In addition, the 
German government must take the initiative to 
publicly espouse the benefits that immigrants 
will bring to German society as opposed to 
remaining silent, thereby permitting right 
extremist groups to propagate myths. 
Second, and more urgent, is the need to 
overturn the official dogma of the nation: that 
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"Germany is not an immigration country." The 
implication of this antiquated view is that the 
nation should invest in the lives of ((das Volk" 
since they are the only ones who have any bear-
ing on the nation's future. If this is the case, 
then what ends do social counseling services, 
anti-racism laws, or federally-subsidized cele-
brations of the heritage of ethnic minorities 
serve? No resolution can be reached between 
the intentions implied in Germany's official 
dogma and the goal of preaching tolerance that 
so many of these programs and institutions are 
designed to attain. Laws and policies must 
reflect reality. 
Third, even if public perceptions could be 
oriented in the right direction, the Auslander 
would still fall short of feeling totally integrat-
ed. Simply put, legal integration must become 
easier, and dual citizenship must become an 
option to exercise. Only then will foreign 
nationals gain the full protection of the law. 
Endowed with a political life, a sense of alle-
giance to Germany will be born in first-gener-
ation immigrants and reinforced in the second-
and third-generation immigrants. 
Germany must acknowledge that it is no 
longer an ethnically homogenous state. Only 
by embracing its multicultural present and 
future will the cloudy distinctions of "we vs. 
they" and "the people vs. the other" begin to 
dissipate, thereby revealing the summit in its 
full brilliance. 
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